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Developed countries grant non-reciprocal preferential market access to products of de-
veloping countries under the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP"). These grants
of preferences are no longer non-reciprocal, however, because developed countries have
started to impose conditions for preferential market access. Developed countries place
these conditions to achieve their own ends rather than enhance the usefulness of the
preferences.
But who decides the conditions to be fulfilled? What role do institutions such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) play in decid-
ing the conditions to be fulfilled? It would seem that the WTO being an international
organization governs all the countries involved in the GSP schemes. However, the condi-
tionalities in GSP schemes have added another layer of governaice-that of the preference-
granting country over the preference-receiving country. Thus, conditional GSP schemes
serve as an instrument of global governance over the developing countries that receive
preferences from developed countries in world trade.
This article will explore the various dimensions of conditionalities in GSP schemes,
including their legitimacy, by examining the European Communities (EC)-Tariff Prefer-
ences case.2 It will also look at the stand of the various players involved in the entire
process that includes the preference-granting and preference-receiving countries as well as
the WTO.
1. Assistant Professor and Assistant Director, Centre for Int'l Trade and Economic Laws, Jindal Global
Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India.
2. Panel Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Develop-
ing Countries, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditions
for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter Appellate Body Report].
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II. The EC-Tariff Preferences Case
In the EC-Tariff Preferences case, the GSP scheme included five arrangements for
granting preferences.3 The EC granted additional preferences to eleven countries
through arrangements meant to combat drug production and trafficking. In 2001, the EC
added Pakistan to this list to reward the country for its stand against the Taliban and to
improve the EC's own access to the Pakistani market.4 India's textiles exports to the EC
declined as a result, leading India to bring a case against the EC at the VTO. This article
uses the Appellate Body (AB) Report to analyze conditional GSP schemes as instruments
of global economic governance. The analysis is applicable to all GSP schemes containing
positive conditionalities.5
III. Analysis of Global Economic Governance a travers the EC-Tariff
Preferences Case
The EC served as an actor of global governance over the eleven countries by requiring
them to fulfill the requirements in the drug arrangements and then over Pakistan by re-
warding it for combating terrorism. The GSP and especially its conditionalities are an
instrument of global economic governance because they are unilateral schemes prone to
modification by the donor countries. Indeed, preference-granting countries may with-
draw the GSP benefits altogether if asked to remove the conditionalities. This shows that
(potential) beneficiaries are subject to a threat of withdrawal of GSP schemes. In fact,
India is the first country to challenge its GSP donor.
India argued the EC could not distinguish between GSP beneficiaries by virtue of the
Most-Favored Nation clause,6 while the EC argued differential treatment of beneficiaries
was possible if based on objective criteria such as the needs of developing countries, quot-
ing paragraph 3(c) 7 of the Enabling Clause in support. This is an example of the donor
country's governance over the beneficiaries and the Enabling Clause's governance over
3. Council Regulation (EC) 2501/2001, Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences for the
Period from Jan. 1, 2002 to Dec. 31, 2004, 2001 OJ (L 346) art. 1:1.
4. Press Release, EUROPA, EU Response to the 11 September European Commission Action (Mar. 12,
2002), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.doReference=MEMO/02/53&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; Press Release, EUROPA, EU Response to the 11 September
European Commission Action (June 3, 2002), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref-
erence=MEMO/02/122&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
5. This article will examine the impact of the Appellate Body Report on negative conditionalities later.
6. Article I:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade reads: "With respect to customs duties and
charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the interna-
tional transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and
charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and
with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article IL, any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I:1, Oct. 30, 1947 61
Stat. A-1l, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
7. This paragraph reads as follows: "Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this
clause: (c) shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to developing coun-
tries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond positively to the development, financial and trade
needs of developing countries." Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Partici-
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the donor countries' GSP schemes. The Clause's interpretation is governed by the WTO
DSB, which is in turn governed by the GSP Resolution of the U.N. Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD). This became explicit when the Panel referred to this res-
olution while interpreting the Enabling Clause.
The AB found that GSP schemes must fulfill the non-discrimination requirement stated
in footnote 3 of the Enabling Clause.8 Additionally, the AB found that paragraph 3(c)
allows GSP donors to differentiate among beneficiaries based on their needs, but limited
the GSP donors' discretion to impose arbitrary conditions by stating that they must treat
similarly situated beneficiaries alike. 9 Thus, the AB governs donor countries' GSP
schemes by means of ensuring their conformity with the Enabling Clause and in so doing,
the AB authorizes the donor countries to govern beneficiaries by differentiating between
them by means of conditionalities.
The AB stated that differentiation between beneficiaries must be based on objective
criteria stated in the WTO Agreement or international instruments,'o thus increasing the
possibility for GSP donors to add conditionalities including non-economic ones. Thus,
international instruments used as conditionalities representing the subjective values of do-
nors are also instruments of governance in their hands to govern the beneficiaries. Also,
the AB has made these international instruments govern dispute settlement at the V TO
because international instruments can be taken into account in WTO dispute settlement
proceedings. However, the criteria the AB laid down to evaluate conditionalities in GSP
schemes are still unclear because it did not clarify how its criteria are equivalent to the
needs of a developing country, as mentioned in paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause.
After the decision allowing differentiation, India expressed its "fear of a return to the
era of special preferences that had prevailed before the GSP had been installed in the
trading system."" Preferences existed before the GSP in the form of former colonies
granting preferential market access to their erstwhile colonial powers. As opposed to the
GSP which was generalized, these reverse preferences were selective and discriminatory
towards developing countries.12 The new system of governance of beneficiaries by GSP
donors places the generalized GSP schemes developed to remedy this discrimination at
risk.
The Decision on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns adopted at Doha states
that preferences granted to developing countries should be non-discriminatory, 3 meaning
that they are not required to be non-discriminatory. This is contrary to the rule laid down
pation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATI B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1979) [hereinafter
Enabling Clause].
8. This footnote reads: "As described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES of 25 June
1971, relating to the establishment of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences benefi-
cial to the developing countries" (BISD 18S/24). Enabling Clause, rupra note 7.
9. Appellate Body Report, supra note 2, 173.
10. Id. 163.
11. WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSB/M/194, 32 (July 20, 2005).
12. Norma Breda dos Santos et al., Generalized System of Preferences in General Agreement on Tariffi and
Trade/World Trade Organization: History and Current Israes, 39(4) J. WORLD TRADE 637, 645 (2005).
13. WTO, Ministerial Declaration on Implementation-related Issues and Concerns of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/17, 41 I.L.M. 757 (2002), 12.2.
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by the AB. But the Ministerial Conference, which interprets VVTO law,14 would prevail
in a future case because DSB reports are only binding on the parties to a dispute whereas
Ministerial Conference interpretations are binding on all WTO members.1s
The EC, knowing that its GSP scheme was applicable only to twelve members, asked
for a waiver from the WTO.16 Since the waiver was not granted, the AB held that the
scheme was incompatible with the Enabling Clause. Thus, not only the DSB but other
organs of the WTO responsible for granting waivers also govern GSP donors.
Discrimination by GSP donors between developing countries in the form of recipient
and non-recipient countries is an example of discriminatory governance. In reality, even
uniform application of conditional GSP schemes may result in discrimination because
some beneficiaries cannot fulfill the conditions, depriving them of additional prefer-
ences. 17 If these potential beneficiaries could fulfill the conditions, they would not need
tariff preferences to encourage their development in the first place.
Furthermore, developing countries face problems apart from drug issues such as lack of
healthcare and education facilities. The question then is whether developed countries
have absolute discretion to choose the problems for which they grant preferences. It may
amount to discriminatory governance if the EC prioritizes drug problems over others,
thus discriminating amongst potential beneficiaries with different needs.
Preferential market access eradicates the drug problem in the beneficiary country and
reduced market access increases the problem in the non-beneficiary country. But the En-
abling Clause does not aim at such a transfer of problems from one country to another.
Thus, developing countries such as India that lost market access were actually paying for
the countries such as Pakistan that gained market access.' 8 Moreover, in such a case, the
recipients of preferences are actors of governance over the non-recipients. India, by filing
a case at the WTO, showed its concern for the other non-recipient developing countries,
thus being an actor of governance over them.
This case also demonstrated opaque governance, another type of global governance
possible. The EC's drug arrangements failed the test laid down by the AB because they
were only available to a closed list of twelve beneficiaries without the possibility of other
countries benefiting from the drug arrangements, even if the non-beneficiaries shared the
same needs as the twelve beneficiaries. The drug arrangements did not lay down the
conditions to exclude beneficiaries. Consequently, the beneficiary countries would con-
tinue to benefit from the drug arrangements whether or not the arrangements resolved
their drug problems. This would provide no benefit to non-beneficiaries that suffered
from a drug problem. Once again, the beneficiaries are governing the non-beneficiaries,
this time due to lack of transparency in the drug arrangements.
14. Article IX:2 of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization reads: "The Ministerial
Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agree-
ment and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements."
15. PETER VAN DEN BosSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION TEXT,
CASES AND MATERIALS 145 (2005).
16. Request for a WTO Waiver, New EC Special Tariff Arrangements to Combat Drug Production and
Trafficking, G/C/W/328, 1 2 (Oct. 24, 2001).
17. India raised this point. See WTO Minutes of Meeting of Trade Policy Review of the European Union,
WITIPR/M/72, T 173 (July 12 & 14, 2000).
18. Ravindra Pratap, WTO and Tariff Preferences India Wins Case, EC the Law, 39(18) ECON. & PoL.
WKLY., 1788 (May 1-7, 2004).
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The AB allowed only non-discriminatory conditions in GSP schemes to protect against
arbitrariness but the UNCTAD resolution authorizing GSP did not envision conditionali-
ties. These conditions are proof of GSP donors' desire to maintain a certain unilateralism
in granting preferences and constitute a form of disguised protectionism.' 9 Indeed, devel-
oped countries may sometimes use conditionalities to promote their own objectives20 and
could misuse the authority to differentiate between beneficiaries with the aim of favoring
certain countries. Thus, on the one hand, the AB wants to govern GSP schemes strictly
but on the other hand, it allowed a certain amount of freedom to the GSP donors to
govern the beneficiaries.
Some authors feel that developing countries should have anticipated the conditionalities
that are sometimes necessary to buy political support for GSP schemes in donor coun-
tries. 21 This means that developing countries should have anticipated a relationship of
governor and governed to further individual political interests of the former by means of
conditionalities.
Apart from these examples of global governance, there is also an example of domestic
governance. The decline in textiles exports led the Indian Ministries of Textiles and Com-
merce to file a case with the VTO, without consulting the representatives of the textiles
industry. The industry is the actual producer and thus the motor of international trade
although, in developing countries such as India, industry is denied a role in global eco-
nomic governance because it is not consulted. Instead, the industry is subject to domestic
governance in such cases because the domestic government alone decides whether a case
should be filed with the WTO. Conversely, there are government mechanisms in devel-
oped countries such as the U.S. Trade Representative and European Commission to take
into account industry concerns. Consequently, these mechanisms are actors of govern-
ance over domestic industry and help industry in developed countries participate in global
governance.
Another example of global governance by domestic constituencies is global governance
by EC citizens. The EC claimed that the drug arrangements were necessary to protect
the health of its citizens under article XX(b)22 of the GATT, but the argument did not
find favor with the Panel. The drug arrangements gave employment opportunities to
citizens of beneficiary countries to end the production of drugs reaching European shores.
Thus, conditionalities help European citizens participate in global governance over the
citizens and governments of developing countries. The EC is an instrument of govern-
19. Stiphane de la Rosa, Observations aprbs le rapport du groupe sp6cial 'Communautis europ6en-
nes-conditions d'octroi de prdf6rence tarifaires aux pays en d6veloppement'. Vets une remise en cause du
SPG communautaire 'A la carte', 15 L'OBSERVATEUR DES NATIONS UNIEs 3, 16, 23 (Automne - Hiver
2003).
20. B. Bhattacharyya, The European Union and India in WTO In Search of Convergence, in THE EUROPEAN
UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD 229 (2002).
2 1. Gene M. Grossman & Alan 0. Sykes, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting ofTarifPrefer-
ences to Developing Countries (WT/DS246/AB/R), in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2003: THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE REPORTERS' STUDIES 236-37 (2006).
22. This article reads: "Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same con-
ditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: (b) necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health." GATT, supra note 6, at art. XX(b).
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ance over the GSP beneficiaries with the aim of protecting its own citizens, although the
primary aim of GSP benefits is to contribute to the development of beneficiaries.
The Appellate Body's Report pertains to positive conditionalities but it will influence
future interpretations of negative conditionalities as well. Paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling
Clause says that preferences must constitute positive responses to the needs of developing
countries, but the question is how will negative conditionalities constitute positive re-
sponses. The Appellate Body's Report could lead to a change in GSP schemes from nega-
tive to positive conditionalities and to a decline in the number of reasons that qualify as
needs that justify differential treatment of beneficiaries.23 GSP donors may put these con-
ditionalities in bilateral agreements with developing countries because they did not antici-
pate that the AB would lay down restrictive criteria governing conditionalities. This will
be a worse form of governance over the developing countries because they will not have
recourse to the VTO DSB. Additionally, developed countries could use a policy of dif-
ferential preferences to pressure developing countries in multilateral negotiations, which
would again be a worse form of governance because there would be no recourse.
After the Appellate Body Report, the EC came up with a new GSP scheme called the
GSP Plus. 24 But' it also suffered from some defects that revealed the dynamics of the
relationship between GSP schemes and global economic governance. The GSP Plus
scheme contained three arrangements to benefit from preferences, one of them being the
special arrangement to encourage sustainable development and good governance. 25 This
arrangement laid down that beneficiaries wanting additional preferences must ratify and
implement a list of international conventions that were also mentioned in the previous EC
GSP scheme. Thus, the new GSP Plus scheme complied with the AB's criteria, and was
not opaque or discriminatory. But, as in the previous case, some developing countries
may not be able to fulfill the conditions in the international conventions. In addition, all
countries with the same needs may not be able to ratify and implement the conventions.
This situation demonstrates how law can be used as an instrument of exclusion. The new
EC GSP scheme and the conventions it referred to were legal instruments. According to
the European Parliament, the requirement of ratifying and implementing international
conventions can create barriers to preferential market access for developing countries. 26
Moreover, countries with different problems must ratify and implement the same conven-
tions. Furthermore, countries' diverse problems are not necessarily reflected in interna-
tional conventions. More importantly, India stated that similarly situated beneficiaries
could not be defined "on the basis of a common commitment to a multitude of interna-
tional conventions by those beneficiaries,"2 7 demonstrating the fallibility of the govern-
ance exercised by the GSP Plus.
23. Lorand Bartels, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Coun-
tries and its Implications for Conditionality in GSP Programmes, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 484 (2005).
24. Council Regulation (EC) 980/2005, Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences, 2005 OJ (L
169). This regulation applied from Jan. 1, 2006 to Dec. 31, 2008.
25. Id. at art. 1:2.
26. James Harrison, Incentives for Development: The EC's Generalized System ofPreferences, India's WTO Chal-
lenge and Reform, 42(6) COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1663, 1681 (2005).
27. Minutes of Meeting, supra note 11, 1 33.
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The EC, by introducing the special arrangement to encourage sustainable development
and good governance, that laid down a list of international conventions i.e. required ful-
fillment of all the criteria mentioned in the previous GSP scheme, tightened the control
over developing countries because the previous GSP scheme allowed countries to fulfill
the criteria under any of the five arrangements, instead of all the criteria under them.
The GSP Plus scheme allowed the EC to determine the needs of developing countries
by means of international conventions that were to be applied in the territory of the bene-
ficiaries. Thus, international conventions served as instruments of global governance by
GSP donors over GSP recipients. In addition, the fact that the EC wanted to conform its
GSP Plus to international conventions shows the governance exercised by international
law over national GSP schemes.
Additionally, the EC imposed non-economic conditions in a GSP scheme that is prima-
rily economic in nature. According to India, the conditionalities also infringed on the
sovereign right of each country to decide the conventions it wanted to ratify and imple-
ment. 5 Moreover, the special regime to encourage sustainable development and good
governance did not benefit countries that had already put into practice, but not ratified,
the laws relating to sustainable development and good governance as specified in the in-
ternational conventions. This is an example of aberrational governance.
After the expiry of Regulation 980/2005, Council Regulation 732/200829 entered into
force. Article 1:2 of this regulation, just like its predecessor Regulation 980/2005, estab-
lishes a special arrangement for sustainable development and good governance requiring
ratification and implementation of a list of international conventions by beneficiaries
wanting additional preferences. This means that the present regulation has the same con-
sequences for potential beneficiaries as the previous GSP Plus scheme. Moreover, the
current GSP scheme will continue until the end of 2013. There is also a proposal for a
revised GSP scheme from Jan. 1, 2014 that reinforces the logic of the current scheme. 30
IV. Conclusion
While developed nations were free to achieve their development as they wished, includ-
ing by protectionism, countries developing today face different circumstances. The devel-
oped countries can often dictate the terms of economic advancement in developing
countries in a way that invokes the old colonialist system.
The conditionalities seek to aid in developing countries' economic advancement by
compelling them to respect human rights. But the use of conditionalities is controversial
because developed and developing countries often have different stands on the condition-
alities attached. Even the stand of the WTO, which also plays a role in furthering human
rights (as seen in this case), and that of its members differs. Another shortcoming of
conditional GSP schemes is their efficacy. Ratification and implementation of interna-
28. Id. 1 35.
29. Council Regulation (EC) 732/2008, Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences for the Pe-
riod from Jan. 1, 2009 to Dec. 31, 2011, 2008 OJ (L 211).
30. European Commission, European Commission Adopts Proposal for the Review of the Generalised
System of Preferences, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-prefer-
ences/ (last updated Oct. 26, 2011).
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tional conventions by a country does not necessarily lead to eradication of problems such
as child labor since governments may not always function for their people.
This article has shown that conditional GSP schemes create multiple layers of govern-
ance that lack utility because they are not coherent. The problem may be resolved by
transparent discussions between the key players such as the donors, the recipients, and the
non-recipients (i.e. domestic governments and industry) as to how to better achieve the
objectives of each actor.
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